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Abstract
We study the modelling and valuation of surrender and other be-
havioural options in life insurance and pension. We place ourselves
in between the two extremes of completely arbitrary intervention and
optimal intervention by the policyholder. We present a method that
is based on differential equations and that can be used to approxi-
mate contract values when policyholders exhibit optimal behaviour.
This presentation includes a specification of sufficient conditions for
both consistency of the model and convergence of the contract values.
When not going to the limit in the approximation we obtain a tech-
nique for balancing off arbitrary and optimal behaviour in a simple,
intuitive way. This leads to our suggestions for intervention models
where one single parameter reflects the extent of rationality among
policyholders. In a series of numerical examples we illustrate the im-
pact of the rationality parameter on the contract values.
Keywords: Behavioural option, Ordinary differential equation, Penalty
method, Optimal stopping, Solvency II
1 Introduction
Modern solvency and accounting rules (Solvency II and IFRS) require that
expected policyholder behaviour is taken into account. This includes e.g.
expected surrender and expected transcription into free policy (paid-up pol-
icy). The expectation is supposed to take into account both the economic
conditions under which the behaviour takes place as well as the extent to
which intervention is to the benefit of the policyholder. The economic con-
ditions and how beneficial it is for the policyholder to intervene may change
over time. Therefore, one should properly speak of dynamic behaviour mod-
els when formalizing these effects in the actuarial valuation formulas. Chang-
ing economic conditions could e.g. be a changing level of interest rates, and
one idea would be to let the intensity or probability of intervention depend
on the current (possibly stochastic) level of interest rates. How beneficial an
action is can be formalized by the gain from intervention. Determining the
gain may be a delicate issue since both intervening and not intervening opens
up for new intervention options in the future that also have to be taken into
account. E.g., not to surrender typically opens up for surrendering later,
and transcription into free policy changes the effect of the surrender option.
This challenge calls for a recursive solution such that the gain is always mea-
suring correctly the tendencies of intervening in the future. We disregard
the economic condition by assuming deterministic interest rates and focus
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on the latter idea of a recursive formula to deal with the benefit of interven-
tion. One motivation for this focus is that, perhaps, the external economic
conditions are supposed to approximate to the internal benefit.
There exists a range of approaches to modelling of behavioural risk. One
extreme is to say that intervention occurs in a completely arbitrary way, like
insurance risk. We hereby mean that we model the behaviour as indepen-
dent of everything else in our model than the state of the policyholder and
the time measured through calendar time, the policyholder’s age, time since
initiation, or time to (deterministic) retirement. Specifically, the behaviour
depends on neither the contract the policyholder holds nor the interest rate.
With this approach it is tractable to study various aspects beyond just
adding surrender to a survival model. Buchardt et al. [3] studied the for-
malistic interaction between semi-Markov modelling of insurance risk and
behavioural risk, including duration dependence of mortality and payments
in the disability state and recognizing duration dependence of free policy
payments. A simpler exposition is found in Buchardt and Møller [2]. Hen-
riksen et al. [9] also combine surrender and free policy options and study
the impact on reserving from different simplifying assumptions about the
dependence between insurance risk and behaviour risk.
Another extreme is to say that intervention occurs in a completely ra-
tional, optimal way. We hereby mean that the policyholder, who is assumed
to have the same information as the insurance company has, intervenes ac-
cording to a strategy that maximizes the value of the insurance contract.
This approach was taken in Steffensen [13], who derived general variational
inequalities that characterize the reserve in case of a multi-state Markov
model for insurance risk and a multi-state model for behavioural risk. In
the surrender case, this is known as American option pricing of surrender
risk. Other early references based on this approach to surrender risk are
Grosen and Jørgensen [8] and Bacinello [1].
In between these extremes exist all different kinds of models where inter-
vention is modelled by an intensity, but where the intensity not only depends
on time but also some stochastic factors. The dependence on the interest
rate appears obvious and is thoroughly examined by De Giovanni [7], who
calculate reserves by solving partial differential equations numerically. There
exists a large amount of literature examining relevant explanatory variables
but since these studies appear somewhat marginal to our approach we re-
fer to Eling and Kiesenbauer [4] and references therein for a comprehensive
literature overview.
Rather than letting the intensity depend on external factors, one could
let the intensity depend on internal factors relevant to the specific policy.
That could e.g. be to take the difference between the surrender value and
(some notion of the) reserve as a measure of how beneficial an intervention
is. If the reserve compared with the surrender value does not take future
intervention options into account, the calculation can be split up in two
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standard exercises: First, calculate the reserve without intervention and then
plug this reserve into the intensity for a calculation including surrender. If
the reserve compared with the surrender value does take future intervention
into account, the (usually) linear Thiele differential equation characterizing
the reserve becomes in general a non-linear differential equation. The non-
linear term comes from the risk premium with respect to the surrender event
that contains a non-linear function of the reserve itself. The rationale for
this paper is to take a thorough look at this non-linear differential equation
in order to motivate it, interpret it, generalize it, and solve it numerically.
Last but not least, we present a probabilistic proof of and clarify sufficient
conditions for a convergence result that may seem intuitively clear: If the
tendency to intervene tends to zero whenever the gain from intervention is
negative and tends to infinity whenever the gain from intervention is positive,
we reach in the limit at the reserve based on completely rational behaviour.
We establish sufficient convergence of intensities to reach such a conclusion.
Thus, our approach to intervention option pricing has two purposes: First,
it represents in itself a relevant approach in between the two extremes that,
certainly, takes into account the extent to which intervention is to the benefit
of the policyholder. Second, for simple parametric forms of the intensity,
our calculation approximates the largest possible liability. As such it can be
used as a worst-case or stress calculation with respect to surrender risk.
The idea of approximating the maximum value by a series of solutions
to differential equation has been known as the penalty method. In compu-
tational finance it has been used as an approximation method for American
option pricing. In Forsyth and Vetzal [5] the penalty method is compared
with alternative techniques for pricing of the American put option. In Gad
and Pedersen [6] the modelling of non-rational option holder behaviour is
studied in a way similar to what is done here. The contribution of the present
paper is three-fold: First, we introduce, to the knowledge of the authors, for
the first time the penalty method in intervention option pricing in insurance.
Second, we prove sufficient conditions for the convergence to hold. Third,
we do not only think of the intensity model as a means of approximating
the largest value, but as a highly relevant approach to general intervention
option pricing, useful in accounting and solvency. The approach balances
arbitrariness and benefit in a simple form, and in some examples we catch
the notion of rationality in one single parameter.
2 Standard Setup
Consider a model with a policyholder who is either alive (active) or dead.
We assume the state of the policyholder is governed by a state process with
a deterministic, continuous death intensity, µ(t), see Figure 1. Let I be the
process indicating whether the policyholder is alive, and let N be the process
3
counting the numbers of deaths of the policyholder. The policyholder is
Active Dead-
µ(t)
Figure 1: Standard survival model.
assumed to have the following simple contract. She pays a deterministic
premium with continuous intensity pi(t) until a terminal time, n, as long as
she is alive. If she is alive at time n she receives a deterministic pension sum
ba(n), and if she dies before then upon death she gets a deterministic death
sum, bad(t). Thus, the accumulated payments in the time interval [0, t] is
given by the following process of accumulated payments:
B(t) = B(0)−
∫ t
0
pi(u)I(u)du+
∫ t
0
bad(u)dN(u) + I(n)ba(n)1(t≥n),
for t ∈ [0, n]. We assume that the market offers a deterministic, contin-
uous interest rate, r(t). We introduce the reserve corresponding to the
policyholder being active as the conditional expected present value of future
payments,
V (t) = E
[∫ n
t
e−
∫ u
t r(τ)dτdB(u)
∣∣∣∣ I(t) = 1] .
We then know, e.g. from [11], that the reserve, V , is continuously differen-
tiable on [0, n) and that it is the solution to Thiele’s differential equation,
V ′(t) = r(t)V (t) + pi(t)− µ(t)(bad(t)− V (t)), (1)
with V (n−) = ba(n).
We now add to our model the possibility that the policyholder surren-
ders. That is, we add the possibility that the policyholder terminates her
contract and instead receives a deterministic, continuous surrender value,
G(t). This can, e.g., be added to the model by assuming that the policy-
holder at any time surrenders with some deterministic, continuous intensity,
ν(t), see Figure 2. We use the term active for when the policy is in force.
Surrender
?
ν(t)
Active Dead-
µ(t)
Figure 2: Standard surrender model.
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Mathematically, the state of surrender is in this model not different from
the state of death, except that the associated payments are different. The
reserve, Vν , is continuously differentiable and solves the following Thiele’s
differential equation, see e.g. [11],
V ′ν(t) = r(t)Vν(t) + pi(t)− µ(t)
(
bad(t)− Vν(t)
)
− ν(t) (G(t)− Vν(t)) , (2)
with Vν(n−) = ba(n).
For Vv to be continuously differentiable we need, in general, that ν
is continuous as assumed above. However, what is really needed is that
ν(t) (G(t)− Vν(t)) is continuous and this can be obtained even when ν is
discontinuous and properly defined at the point where G(t) = Vν(t).
The surrender value G can be anything exogenously given. In practice it
is, typically, a technical value of the same payment stream based on technical
assumptions on interest rates and intensities that we denote by (r∗, µ∗). In
that case, the surrender value is the technical reserve V ∗ that solves (1) with
(r, µ) replaced by (r∗, µ∗).
3 Reserve Dependent Surrender
The forthcoming Solvency II regulations requires that the traditional mod-
elling of surrender is revisited. In Article 79 of the Solvency II Directive it is
stated that ”Any assumptions made by insurance and reinsurance undertak-
ings with respect to the likelihood that policyholders will exercise contractual
options, including lapses and surrender, shall be realistic and based on cur-
rent and credible information. The assumptions shall take account, either
explicitly or implicitly, of the impact that future changes in financial and
non-financial conditions may have on the exercise of those options”. Thus,
we need to investigate and model what influences the policyholders choice
to surrender and we need to be able to calculate the reserves in the more
advanced models. In the present section we suggest a way to do this, and
discuss our method.
In a more realistic model of surrender we want to be able to express
both that surrender is likely influenced by how profitable it is, but also
that it is still random. On one hand, we wish surrender to be influenced
by how profitable it is, because surrender is a decision the policyholder
makes. On the other hand we also have multiple reasons for surrender being
random. Randomness is natural because the policyholder most likely lacks
information to decide what is profitable. Even if she had all the information
that the pension fund has and were able to use it, then her preferences
may differ seemingly randomly from the model set up by the pension fund
because of the policyholders personal preference and economical situation.
She might shift her job and get an offer from a new pension fund or she
might need cash for a divorce.
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We can obtain randomness in our model by keeping the surrender mod-
elled by an intensity. Further, we model that the policyholders decision
depends on how profitable it is by letting the surrender intensity depend
on how profitable it is for the policyholder to surrender. If she surrenders
at time t she gains G(t), but she loses the rest of the contract including
her right to exercise later. Hence, she loses Vν(t). Therefore, we denote
by G(t) − Vν(t) her profit from surrendering at time t. We would like the
surrender intensity to be non-negative and increasing in this profit. At first
glance this modelling seems to have a problem that the definition of the
surrender intensity is circular. However, Theorem 3.1 below gives sufficient
conditions for this circular definition not to be a problem.
Theorem 3.1 For some given non-negative function, h, consider the fol-
lowing differential equation in the function U :
U ′(t) = r(t)U(t) + pi(t)− µ(t)(bad(t)−U(t))− h(t, U(t))(G(t)−U(t)), (3)
with U(n−) = ∆B(n). Suppose (3) has a unique solution, U , and define
a surrender intensity by ν(t) ≡ h(t, U(t)). Then U is the reserve when the
policyholder chooses to surrender at time t with intensity ν(t).
Proof: The possible problem in this model is the circular definition of the
surrender intensity. However, the existence and uniqueness of the solution
to both (2) and (3) ensures that this does not become a problem.
The process ν defined by ν(t) ≡ h(t, U(t)) is uniquely determined from
(3) and the reserve is then uniquely determined from (2). It follows from
the definition of U that U solves (2), and then from the uniqueness of the
solution to (2) it follows that the reserve is given by U .
Once we have decided on a policyholder with a specific policy and a
function h, and thereby also ν, then for this single policyholder, our model
does not differ from a model with a deterministic time dependent surrender
intensity as what we had in the classical model of (2). However, when we
use the model for pricing a portfolio of insurance contracts for a group of
policyholders, then the model assigns different surrender intensities to each
policyholder. Thereby, the reserves in general become higher than if we had
used a constant surrender intensity or a specific time dependent surrender
intensity for the whole portfolio.
The relation between the surrender intensity and the profitability may
be chosen in many different ways. Two examples we investigate are:
ν(t) = h(t, Vν(t)) = ψ exp{θ(G(t)− Vν(t))}, (4)
ν(t) = h(t, Vν(t)) = θ1(G(t)−Vν(t)>0), (5)
where ψ, θ > 0 are constants. For equation (4), ψ tells about the overall
tendency to surrender, whereas θ tells about how profitability creates devi-
ations from this tendency. For equation (5), θ controls both. In both cases
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we speak of θ as the rationality parameter. Other intensity functions can be
chosen and one should choose a functional form which matches with data.
The only mathematical requirement is that the function h has to make it
possible to use Theorem 3.1.
One immediate drawback of our model is that we most often do not
have an explicit solution for the differential equation (3). This implies that
we do not have an explicit expression for the reserve. However, we do
have algorithms available for numerical solutions to ordinary differential
equations.
4 Reserve Dependent Policyholder Behaviour
The idea of modelling behaviour by profit dependent intensities may be used
for other applications as well. Within life insurance the policyholder’s choice
to convert into free policy (paid-up policy) has some resemblance with the
surrender choice. Thereby we may find it reasonable to expand our model
with the possibility of conversion into free policy in the same way as we
added surrender. Figure 3 displays a simple model where νaf denotes the
intensity of conversion into free policy, νas denotes the intensity of surrender
when active and νfs denotes the intensity of surrender after converted into
free policy. Here the term active is used when the policyholder is paying
premiums.
Free Policy
?

HH
HHY
HHHHj

*
νaf (t)
νas(t) µ(t)
νfs(t) µ(t)
Active
Surrender Dead
Figure 3: Free policy and surrender model.
If all transition intensities are known explicitly, this model is studied in
[9]. When a policyholder converts into free policy the payments are reduced
depending of the time of conversion. Let bfd(t, u) denote the death sum
at time t if converted into free policy at time u, let bf (n, u) denote the
terminal payment at time n if converted into free policy at time u, and let
Gf (t, u) denote the surrender value at time t when converted into free policy
at time u. For the reserves we let Va(t) denote the reserve at time t if the
policyholder is active, and let Vf (t, u) denote the reserve at time t if the
policyholder is in the free policy state and converted to free policy at time
u. Now, we assume that the intensities are reserve dependent and given in
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the form
νas(t) = has(t, Va(t)),
νaf (t) = haf (t, Va(t)),
νfs(t, u) = hfs(t, u, Vf (t, u)).
Then the reserves are given from the following differential equations:
d
dt
Va(t) = r(t)Va(t) + pi(t)− µ(t)(bad(t)− Va(t))
−has(t, Va(t))(G(t)− Va(t))− haf (t, Va(t))(Vf (t, t)− Va(t)),
Va(n−) = ba(n),
∂
∂t
Vf (t, u) = r(t)Vf (t, u)− µ(t)(b∗fd(t, u)− Vf (t, u))
−hfs(t, u, Vf (t, u))(Gf (t, u)− Vf (t, u)),
Vf (n−, u) = bf (n, u).
The only requirement is that the system of differential equations has a unique
solution. However, the differential equations from above are heavy to work
with, as we need to solve a new differential equation for each value of Vf (t, t).
When modelling the free policy option, this problem is usually overcome by
introducing a scaling function, f , that describes the reduction of payments
as a result of the conversion to free policy. Thus, bfd(t, u) = f(u)bad(t),
bf (n, u) = f(u)ba(n) and Gf (t, u) = f(u)Gf (t). Assume the transition in-
tensity νfs does not depend on the time of transition to free policy. Then the
prospective reserve, V ∗f (t), from the free policy state based on the payments
Gf (t), bad(t) and ba(n) does not depend on this transition time either, and
we get Vf (t, u) = f(u)V
∗
f (t) with
d
dt
V ∗f (t) = r(t)V
∗
f (t)− µ(t)(bad(t)− V ∗f (t))
−νfs(t)(Gf (t)− V ∗f (t)),
V ∗f (n−) = ba(n).
This makes Vf (t, u) a lot easier to calculate. For more on the determination
of the reference payments and scaling function, see [9]. Note however that if
νfs cannot depend on the time of transition to free policy, u, then it cannot
depend on Gf (t, u)− Vf (t, u) either and this is a large disadvantage.
To get profit dependent choices we may use
νas(t) = has(t, Va(t)) = ψase
θas(G(t)−Va(t)),
νaf (t) = haf (t, Va(t)) = ψafe
θap(Vf (t,t)−Va(t)),
νfs(t, u) = hfs(t, u, Vf (t, u)) = ψfse
θfs(Gf (t,u)−Vf (t,u)).
8
5 Approximation of the Worst Case Reserve
In the two previous sections we discussed our model with reserve dependent
surrender and we found it being a reasonable model for predicting the dy-
namics of surrender. However, in the following section we discuss how the
model may also be used for determining worst case reserves when the true
dynamics of the surrender intensity is not known. This is because our model
is a version of what in the literature is known as the penalty method, and a
large rationality parameter gives us the worst case reserve.
Typically the technical reserve is paid out upon surrender (potentially
minus expenses). In that case, if we take maximum of the technical reserve
and the market reserve calculated under the assumption of no surrender,
then we get a worst case reserve of either surrendering immediately or never
surrender. However, a surrender strategy somewhere in between the two
extremes may result in a higher market reserve. For determining the worst
case reserve we consider all possible surrender strategies. To do this we
construct a more general model. We assume that the transition from active
to surrender is governed by a randomized stopping time, τ , with respect to
the state of the policyholder, with randomized stopping times being defined
as in [12]. That is, the time of surrender may depend on everything but the
future time of death and the future interest rate. If the policyholder never
surrenders her contract we let τ = n. The model is illustrated in Figure
4. The class of admissible surrender strategies at time t are the variables
in [t, n] that are randomized stopping times with respect to the filtration
generated from I. We denote this class by Tt.
Surrender
?
τ
Active Dead-
µ(t)
Figure 4: Optimal surrender model.
We hereby disregard the possibility that the policyholder has more in-
formation about her future time of death than the insurance company has.
We do this despite that such knowledge could influence the policyholders
decisions.
Let Vτ denote the prospective reserve if the policyholder surrenders ac-
cording to the randomized stopping time τ . Assume G(n) = 0, assume
G(n−) ≤ V (n−) and assume G continuous on [0, n). Then from [11] it
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follows that Vτ is given by:
Vτ (t) = E
[∫ τ
t
e−
∫ u
t r(x)dxdB(u) + e−
∫ τ
t r(x)dxG(τ)I(τ)
∣∣∣∣ I(t) = 1]
= V (t) + E
[
e−
∫ τ
t r(x)dxG(τ)I(τ)−
∫ n
τ
e−
∫ u
t r(x)dxdB(u)
∣∣∣∣ I(t) = 1]
= V (t) + E
[
e−
∫ τ
t r(x)dxI(τ)G(τ)
∣∣∣ I(t) = 1]
−E
[
e−
∫ τ
t r(x)dxI(τ)E
[∫ n
τ
e−
∫ u
τ r(x)dxdB(u)
∣∣∣∣ τ, I(τ) = 1]∣∣∣∣ I(t) = 1]
= V (t) + E
[
e−
∫ τ
t r(x)dxI(τ) (G(τ)− V (τ))
∣∣∣ I(t) = 1] .
Consider the worst case scenario for the pension fund, where the policy
holder chooses the surrender strategy as the stopping time, τ , that max-
imizes Vτ . This is an optimal stopping problem. Any classical stopping
time from the filtration generated by I must fulfil τI(τ) = t0I(t0) for some
deterministic t0 ∈ [t,∞]. The reserve is then given by:
Vτ (t) = V (t) + E
[
e−
∫ τ
t r(x)dxI(τ) (G(τ)− V (τ))
∣∣∣ I(t) = 1]
= V (t) + e−
∫ t0
t r(x)+µ(x)dx (G(t0)− V (t0)) .
Thus, for the classical optimal stopping problem, without randomization
allowed, it is optimal to choose t0 as any time from the set:
At ≡ arg max
u∈[t,n]
(
e−
∫ u
t r(x)+µ(x)dx(G(u)− V (u))
)
.
As the inner part is continuous in u on [0, n) and as G(n−) − V (n−) <
G(n)− V (n), then At must have a largest element. Denote this element by
u∗, i.e. let u∗(t) ≡ maxAt, such that u∗(t) is the latest optimal time to
surrender. Let τ∗ = u∗(t)I(u∗(t)) + n(1 − I(u∗(t))). We define the worst
case reserve, W , by:
W (t) = sup
τ∈Tt
Vτ (t) = Vτ∗(t).
By a proof similar to the one of the verification theorem of Chapter 9 of
[10] it may be seen that τ∗ is optimal even if we allow randomized surrender
strategies.
Now, assume a family of functions, hθ, is implied. Let τθ denote the sur-
render strategy of surrendering at time u with intensity νθ(u) = hθ(G(u)−
Vνθ(u)) and let Vθ = Vνθ with Vνθ as defined in Sect. 3. Let
h¯θ(x) ≡ sup
y≤x
hθ(y),
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and
hθ(x) ≡ inf
y≥x
hθ(y).
Now, the following holds:
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that for each θ ≥ 0 we have that hθ is defined in a
way such that we may use Theorem 3.1 and suppose that the surrender value
G is continuous on [0, n) with G(n−) ≤ V (n−) and G(n) = 0. Also assume
for x < 0:
h¯θ(x)→ 0, θ →∞, (6)
and for x > 0:
hθ(x)→∞, θ →∞. (7)
Then, for every t ∈ [0, n]:
Vθ(t)→W (t), θ →∞.
For a proof, see the appendix.
Remark 5.1 Some of the details in the proof has been omitted, but a fully
detailed proof following the same reasoning for a closely related result for an
American Put option may be found in [6]. The fact that the penalty method
provides convergence and the rate of convergence is not new. However, we
find the proof of our article and of [6] interesting. This is because they visu-
alize how the error terms may be thought of as probabilities of economically
bad choices of the policyholder times the loss the policyholder faces from her
bad choices.
6 Numerical Examples
In this section we show four examples of how various surrender models im-
pact the development of the reserves in four different interest rate situations.
In each example we consider a contract with a constant premium intensity of
pi = 7, 000, a death sum of bad = 1, 000, 000 and a pension sum of 2, 000, 000
. All values measured in DKK. These numbers are chosen as they have a
realistic level for a Danish pension policy. For fairly realistic numbers in
EUR divide by ten. The policyholder is assumed to be 35 years old at time
0 and the time of retirement is at age 65. Time is measured in years and
her death intensity is assumed to be given by:
µ(t) = 0.0005 + 105.728−10+0.038∗(t+35).
This is the death intensity from the Danish life table G82 for females. If the
policyholder surrenders her contract, she receives a surrender value given by
the technical reserve. The technical reserve is based on the same payments as
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the contract, and on a technical interest rate intensity of rˆ = 0.05. Interest
rates are chosen high to better visualize the impact of the choice of surrender
intensity. We assume no extra expenses at surrender. Thus, the surrender
value is given from the differential equation:
G′(t) = rˆG(t) + pi − µ(t)(bad −G(t)), (8)
with G(n−) = 2, 000, 000. We consider the following five surrender models:
Model a : νa(t) = 0.05 · exp{0.000003(G(t)− Vθ,ψ(t))}
Model b : νb(t) = 0.05 · 1(G(t)−Vθ(t))
Model c : νc(t) = 0.05
Model d : νd(t) = 0
Model e : νe(t) = 5 · 1(G(t)−Vθ(t)).
The first three models are based on a surrender intensity of around 5%.
The last model is a model with a rationality parameter θ = 5, which has
been found to be high enough for us to approximate the worst case reserve.
Additionally, we consider four different developments of the interest rate, r,
used for pricing market reserves. For the two first interest rate situations we
compare the surrender value and the reserves for the five different surrender
models. For the two last interest rate situations we compare the surrender
value and the reserves for surrender Model d and Model e.
Example 1: Market interest rate is above technical interest rate
Assume r = 0.12. The reserve developments are displayed in Figure 5.
In this situation it is at all time points optimal for the policyholder to
surrender. The worst case reserve corresponds to the surrender value. The
lowest reserve is the market reserve based on no surrender, Model d. Models
with a chance of surrender has reserves in between. Since there is no risk
of surrendering too early, then Model b and the traditional Model c do not
differ. For Model a we get a slightly higher reserve than the one for Model
b and Model c, because the basic intensity 0.05 is slightly increased at all
time points by the exponential factor in the intensity.
Example 2: Market interest rate is below technical interest rate
Assume r = 0.02. The reserve developments are displayed in Figure 6. In
this situation it is never optimal for the policyholder to surrender. The
worst case reserve corresponds to the market reserve with no surrender.
In Model b and Model e the policyholder does not make the mistake of
surrendering if it is not profitable, and thus, this has an equally high reserve.
The surrender value is the lowest value and the reserves of Model a and the
traditional Model c are in between. Model a has a higher reserve than Model
c, because the basic intensity 0.05 is slightly increased at all time points by
the exponential factor in the intensity.
12
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Figure 5: Example 1. The technical interest rate is rˆ = 0.05. The market
interest rate is r = 0.12. Immediate surrender is always optimal.
Example 3: Market interest rate is decreasing Assume r(t) = 0.10 ·
1(t≤20) +0.04 ·1(t>20). The qualitative feature we capture is that the interest
rate crosses the guaranteed interest rate downwards. The reserve develop-
ments are displayed in Figure 7. In this situation it is optimal to surrender
if the surrender value is higher that the market reserve in Model d with
no surrender. Thus, after time t = 20 it is optimal to keep the contract
because the technical interest rate is higher than the market interest rate.
Right before time t = 20 the interest rate of the market is higher than the
technical interest rate, but this is only for a short time, and thus it is still
optimal to keep the policy in order to benefit from the technical interest
rate later on. At some point before time t = 20 the surrender value and
the market reserve of Model d intersects. Before this time it is optimal to
surrender because the gain from the high market interest rate before time
t = 20 is then higher than the future loss from the low market interest rate.
All together the worst case reserve is given as the maximum of the surrender
value and the market reserve with no surrender.
Example 4: Market interest rate is increasing Assume r(t) = 0.01 ·
1(t≤20)+0.065·1(t>20). The qualitative feature we capture is that the interest
rate crosses the guaranteed interest rate upwards. The reserve developments
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Figure 6: Example 2. The technical interest rate is rˆ = 0.05. The market
interest rate is r = 0.02. Surrender is never optimal.
are displayed in Figure 8. In this situation we have that after time t = 20 it is
optimal to surrender. Before time t = 20 it is optimal to plan to surrender at
time t = 20. With this strategy the policyholder benefits from both the high
market interest rate after time t = 20 and the technical interest rate before
time t = 20 when the market interest rate is low. Thereby, unlike in the
previous three examples, the worst case reserve is no longer the supremum
of the surrender value and the market reserve with no surrender. Before
time t = 20 the worst case reserve is higher than both of the other reserves,
because there exists a surrender strategy which is better for the policyholder
than both immediate surrender and no surrender.
We recall that the reserves of Model a and Model b converge to the worst
case reserve when the rationality parameter converges to infinity. Thus,
if the rationality parameter is sufficiently high and the future increase in
interest rate is sufficiently high, then the reserves of Model a and Model b
become higher than the maximum of the surrender value and the market
reserve of Model d with no surrender.
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Figure 7: Example 3. The technical interest rate is rˆ = 0.05. The market
interest rate is r(t) = 0.10 · 1(t≤20) + 0.04 · 1(t>20). Surrender is optimal if
the surrender value is higher than the market reserve with no surrender.
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A Proof of Theorem 5.1
The proof is divided in two parts. One part associated with the risk from the
νθ based stopping time surrendering before the optimal time u
∗ and another
part associated with the risk from the νθ based stopping time surrendering
after the optimal time u∗. For this reason we define an intermediate reserve,
Wθ. The surrender strategy related to Wθ resembles the one related to Vθ.
The only difference is that the strategy related to Wθ does not surrender be-
fore the optimal time. Mathematically we make the following definition. Let
τˆθ,t be a stopping time for which the policyholder surrenders at time u with
intensity νθ(u)1(u≥u∗(t)). We may write this stopping time in a convenient
way by introducing stopping times, τˆ iθ,t, given recursively by τˆ
0
θ,t ≡ 0 and τˆ iθ,t
for i ∈ N surrenders with intensity νθ(u)1(u≥τˆ i−1θ,t ). With these definitions we
get:
(I, τˆθ,t)
d
= (I,
∞∑
i=1
τˆ iθ,t1(τˆ i−1θ,t <u∗(t)≤τˆ iθ,t)).
This identity comes from renewal theory and the memoryless property of
the exponential distribution. It says that it does not matter if we set the
surrender intensity to zero before the optimal time or if we make the policy
holder regret her decision every time she is about to surrender before the
optimal time. We denote for s ∈ [t, n] by Wθ(t, s) the reserve at time s
associated with the surrender strategy τˆθ,t. Then, from the identity above
we find that
Wθ(t, s) = V (s) +
∞∑
i=1
Es
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
s r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ iθ)− V (τˆ iθ))1(τˆ i−1θ ≤u∗(t)<τˆ iθ)
]
.
Part 1: First we show that for every t ∈ [0, n]:
lim inf
θ→∞
Vθ(t) ≤ lim inf
θ→∞
Wθ(t, t).
To prove this we use, given t ∈ [0, n] and ε > 0, the following notation about
stopping times, τ :
{τ good} = {G(τ)− Vθ(τ) ≥ 0},
{τ ok} = {G(τ)− Vθ(τ) ∈ [−ε, 0)},
{τ bad} = {G(τ)− Vθ(τ) < −ε}.
Thus, a stopping time, τ , is called good when it is profitable to surrender at
the corresponding time, and it is called bad when the policy holder loses more
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than ε on surrendering. In the following, let u∗ ≡ u∗(t) and let τˆ iθ ≡ τˆ iθ,t.
By induction one can show that for every m ∈ N:
Vθ(t) = V (t) + Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ1θ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ1θ )− V (τˆ1θ ))
]
≥ V (t)
+
m∑
i=1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ iθ)− V (τˆ iθ))1(τˆ i−1θ ≤u∗<τˆ iθ,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆ i−1θ ok or good)
]
+Et
[
e−
∫ τˆm+1
θ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆm+1θ )− V (τˆm+1θ ))1(τˆmθ ≤u∗,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆmθ ok or good)
]
+
m∑
i=1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ iθ)− V (τˆ iθ))1(τˆ iθ≤u∗,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆ i−1θ ok or good,τˆ iθbad)
]
−ε
m∑
i=1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du1(τˆ iθ≤u∗,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆ i−1θ ok or good,τˆ iθok)
]
(9)
The idea is that the reserve Vθ corresponds to the technical reserve, V ,
plus the expected gain from surrender. We investigate what happens if the
policyholder regrets to surrender. The impact if the policy holder regrets
to surrender at the observed stopping time, τˆ1θ , depends on whether this
stopping time was good, ok or bad. If the stopping time is good, then we
know that the value of the gain of surrender is at least as high as waiting
for the next time to surrender, and if the stopping time is ok, then we know
that the value of the gain of surrender is at most ε worse than waiting for
the next time to surrender. In the above expression we have made these
judgements for up to m surrender possibilities before the optimal time.
The sum in the first line corresponds to the case when one of the first
m stopping times reaches beyond the optimal time, u∗. The terms of the
second line correspond to the case when all of the first m stopping times
are before the optimal time, u∗, and they have all been ok or good. In this
case, the value of the gain of surrendering at the first stopping time is no
higher than waiting for the m + 1’th stopping time. The sum in the third
line corresponds to the case when one of the m first stopping times is bad
and is before the optimal time, u∗. The sum of the fourth line is a correction
of the ε-small loses from ok stopping times.
If we display the bound relative to Wθ instead of relative to the technical
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reserve, V , then we get the following expression:
Vθ(t)
≥ Wθ(t, t)−
∞∑
i=1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ iθ)− V (τˆ iθ))1(τˆ i−1θ ≤u∗<τˆ iθ,∃j∈{1,...,i−1}: τˆ jθ bad)
]
−
∞∑
i=m+1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ iθ)− V (τˆ iθ))1(τˆ i−1θ ≤u∗<τˆ iθ,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆ i−1θ ok or good)
]
+Et
[
e−
∫ τˆm+1
θ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆm+1θ )− V (τˆm+1θ ))1(τˆmθ ≤u∗,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆmθ ok or good)
]
+
m∑
i=1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆ iθ)− V (τˆ iθ))1(τˆ iθ≤u∗,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆ i−1θ ok or good,τˆ iθbad)
]
−ε
m∑
i=1
Et
[
e−
∫ τˆ iθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du1(τˆ iθ≤u∗,τˆ1θ ,...,τˆ i−1θ ok or good,τˆ iθok)
]
.
In the limit of θ, ε and m, then Wθ is the only term which does not converge
to 0. To see this, notice that there exists some K > 0 such that for all
u ∈ [t, n]:
G(u)− V (u),∈ [−K,K], and G(u)− Vθ(u) ∈ [−K,K].
That is, for any stopping time, the adjustment G − V is bounded by K.
Thereby we may further bound the value of Vθ by replacing each of these
adjustments with −K times an upper bound of the probability of the cor-
responding event:
Vθ(t) ≥ Wθ(t, t)−KPt(∃j ∈ N : τˆ jθ bad, τˆ jθ ≤ u∗)−K
∞∑
i=m+1
Pt(τˆ i−1θ ≤ u∗ < τˆ iθ)
−KPt(τˆmθ ≤ u∗, τˆ1θ , . . . , τˆmθ ok or good)−KPt(∃j ∈ N : τˆ jθ bad, τˆ jθ ≤ u∗)
−ε
m∑
i=1
Pt(τˆ iθ ≤ u∗, τˆ iθok)
≥ Wθ(t, t)−K(1− e(n−t)h¯θ(−ε))−K
∞∑
i=m+1
Pt(τˆ i−1θ ≤ u∗ < τˆ iθ)
−KPt(τˆmθ ≤ u∗)−K(1− e(n−t)h¯θ(−ε))− εn.
Given θ and ε, then this holds for every n. Thus, the second sum can be made
arbitrarily small and so can Pt(τˆnθ ≤ u∗), the later follows because given θ,
then the intensity of surrender is bounded on [0, n] and thus the distribution
of the number of τˆ iθ before u
∗ is bounded by a Poisson distribution. Thereby:
lim inf
θ→∞
Vθ(t) ≥ lim inf
θ→∞
Wθ(t, t).
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We find from the calculations above that the lower bound holds because
the surrender strategy of Wθ and Vθ only differs by the strategy of Wθ,
regretting every surrender before the optimal time. The impact of this
difference is bounded because the following main reasons: The probability
of a bad stopping time converges to zero in the limit because of (6). The
number of ok or good stopping times occurring before the optimal time
is finite. Regret of a good stopping time decreases the value. Regret of
an ok stopping time has an impact bounded by ε. At last, the technical
calculations justify that the convergence of ε does not cancel the impact of
the convergence of (6).
Part 2: Consider some arbitrary t ∈ [0, n]. We wish to show that:
Wθ(t, t)→W (t), θ → .
Let u∗ ≡ u∗(t) and τˆθ = τˆθ,t, and notice that since the policyholders related
to Wθ, W and Vθ behave similarly before time u
∗, then convergence at time
t corresponds to convergence at time u∗. This is seen from:
W (t)−Wθ(t, t) = Et
[
e−
∫ u∗
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(u∗)− V (u∗))
−e−
∫ τˆθ
t r(u)+µ(u)du(G(τˆθ)− V (τˆθ))
]
= e−
∫ u∗
t r(u)+µ(u)du(W (u∗)−Wθ(u∗, u∗))
= e−
∫ u∗
t r(u)+µ(u)du(W (u∗)− Vθ(u∗)).
Thereby, it is sufficient to prove that Vθ(u
∗)→W (u∗) when θ →∞. Either
this holds, or there is some ε1 > 0 and some sequence (θi)i∈N converging to
infinity such that for all i ∈ N: Vθi(u∗) < W (u∗) − 2ε1. Thereby Vθi(u∗) <
G(u∗)− 2ε1.
The derivative of Vθi is uniformly bounded over i as long as Vθi < G.
Thus, there exists some δ1 such that Vθi(u) ≤ G(u)− ε1 for u ∈ [u∗, u∗+ δ1].
For this time interval the gain of surrender compared to waiting is at least
ε1, and thereby, for this time interval the intensity for surrender is at least
hθi(ε1).
As V is continuous, then, for every ε2 > 0, there exists some δ2 such that
(G(u∗) − V (u∗)) − e−
∫ t
u∗ r(u)+µ(u)du(G(t) − V (t)) ≤ ε2 for t ∈ [u∗, u∗ + δ2].
That is, if surrender happens within time δ2 of the optimal time then the
loss of the delay is at most ε2.
Now, let δ = δ1 ∧ δ2. Then the loss of surrender according to τˆθi instead
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of at the optimal time is bounded in the following way:
W (u∗)− Vθi(u∗)
= E
[
(G(u∗)− V (u∗))− (G(τˆθi)− V (τˆθi))e−
∫ τˆθi
u∗ r(x)+µ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ τˆθi ≤ δ]P(τˆθi ≤ δ)
+E
[
(G(u∗)− V (u∗))− (G(τˆθi)− V (τˆθi))e−
∫ τˆθi
u∗ r(x)+µ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ (τˆθi ≤ δ)c]P((τˆθi ≤ δ)c)
≤ ε2 + E
[
(G(u∗)− V (u∗))− (G(τˆθi)− V (τˆθi))e−
∫ τˆθi
u∗ r(x)+µ(x)dx
∣∣∣∣ (τˆθi ≤ δ)c] e−δhθi (ε1)
≤ ε2 + 2Ke−δhθi (ε1).
Thus Vθi(u
∗)→W (u∗) as θ →∞, and the result follows.
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